Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is before the U.S. Supreme Court again, this time in Louisiana v. Callais.

After extensive back and forth among the state Legislature, the governor’s office, and the federal judiciary, Louisiana–with its six congressional districts–drew a second congressional district in which a majority of the residents are black.

Drawing such a district would be one thing if the district–to put it in colloquial terms–were a normal-looking district.

But this district isn’t a normal-looking district. Instead, it looks like a Rorschach test. To put it simplistically, this district runs from southeastern Louisiana to northwest Louisiana, sweeping up black neighborhoods and communities while excluding non-black neighborhoods and communities, along the way.

Underlying all of this are debates over Section 2. Among them are:

– Does Section 2 require drawing districts in which particular groups are a majority to help group members win more seats? Advocates of this urge it’s necessary to avoid “vote dilution.” That is, diluting the votes of group members.

– If so, does Section 2 permit drawing districts that look like Rorschach tests?

– To the extent that the answer to either or both of these questions is “yes,” is Section 2 constitutional?

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In a 1995 concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, asserted that Section 2 addresses voting itself, not election results. Quoting Section 2, Thomas wrote, “Only a ‘voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure’ can be challenged under (Section) 2.”

Nevertheless, Thomas said, the high court, in 1969, started expanding Section 2. His concurrence continues:

“The broad reach we have given the section might suggest that the size of a governing body, like an election method that has the potential for diluting the vote of a minority group, should come within the terms of the (a)ct. But the gloss we have placed on the words ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ in cases alleging dilution is at odds with the terms of the statute and has proved utterly unworkable in practice. A review of the current state of our cases shows that by construing the (a)ct to cover potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms, we have immersed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory–questions judges must confront to establish a benchmark concept of an ‘undiluted’ vote. Worse, in pursuing the ideal measure of voting strength, we have devised a remedial mechanism that encourages federal courts to segregate voters into racially designated districts to ensure minority electoral success. In doing so, we have collaborated in what may aptly be termed the racial ‘balkaniz(ation)’ of the (n)ation. …

“The statute was originally perceived as a remedial provision directed specifically at eradicating discriminatory practices that restricted blacks’ ability to register and vote in the segregated South. Now, the (a)ct has grown into something entirely different. In construing the (a)ct to cover claims of vote dilution, we have converted the (a)ct into a device for regulating, rationing, and apportioning political power among racial and ethnic groups. In the process, we have read the (a)ct essentially as a grant of authority to the federal judiciary to develop theories on basic principles of representative government, for it is only a resort to political theory that can enable a court to determine which electoral systems provide the ‘fairest’ levels of representation or the most ‘effective’ or ‘undiluted’ votes to minorities. …

“The dabbling in political theory that dilution cases have prompted, however, is hardly the worst aspect of our vote dilution jurisprudence. Far more pernicious has been the (c)ourt’s willingness to accept the one underlying premise that must inform every minority vote dilution claim: the assumption that the group asserting dilution is not merely a racial or ethnic group, but a group having distinct political interests as well.

Of necessity, in resolving vote dilution actions we have given credence to the view that race defines political interest. We have acted on the implicit assumption that members of racial and ethnic groups must all think alike on important matters of public policy and must have their own ‘minority preferred’ representatives holding seats in elected bodies if they are to be considered represented at all.”

This “implicit assumption” about “members of racial and ethnic groups” is condescending and insulting.

Thomas is right to reject it.

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In 1995, Thomas had two votes–his and Scalia’s–for these positions.

Let’s see whether he has more now, especially–but not only–given that none of the current justices other than Thomas were on the court in 1995.

A decision is expected by June.

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Dr. Randy Elf urges you to read the opinion in Louisiana v. Callais when it issues.

(c) 2026 BY RANDY ELF